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This paper discusses the impact of foreign aid on the 
recipient country's preparedness against natural disasters. 
The theoretical model shows that foreign aid can have 
two opposing effects on a country's level of mitigating 
activities. In order to test the theoretical propositions, the 
authors analyze the effect of foreign aid dependence on 
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ex-ante risk-management activity proxied by the death 
toll from major storms, floods and earthquakes occurring 
worldwide between 1980 and 2002. They find evidence 
that the crowding-out effect of foreign aid outweighs 
the preventive effect in the case of storms, while there is 
mixed evidence in the case of floods and earthquakes. 
 























Keywords: Foreign Aid, Samaritan's Dilemma, Natural Hazards 
 







* Institute of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck, Universitaetsstrasse 15, A-6020 Innsbruck 
and alpS -  Center for Natural Hazard Management, Innsbruck, Austria.  Emails: 
paul.raschky@uibk.ac.at; manijeh.schwindt@uibk.ac.at. This paper –a product of the Global Facility for 
Disaster Reduction and Recovery Unit, Sustainable Development Network Vice Presidency- is 
part of a larger effort in the department to disseminate the emerging findings of the forth coming 
joint World Bank-UN Assessment of the Economics of Disaster Risk Reduction. The team leader 
for the Assessment – Apurva Sanghi – can be contacted at “asanghi@worldbank.org”. We thank 
Jesus Crespo-Cuaresma, Carol Heller, Roland Hodler, Phil Keefer, Howard Kunreuther, Susanne 
Neckermann,  Harald Oberhofer, Apurva Sanghi, Mark Schelker, Reimund Schwarze  and 
Hannelore Weck-Hannemann as well as participants of a  
 
workshop on political economy in Zurich 2007 for their useful comments. 2 
 
1  Introduction 
 
The debate among economic scholars whether foreign aid is a boon or a bane for developing 
countries has been going on for decades. This paper further augments the existing discussion by 
analyzing the effects of foreign aid on the recipient country's capacity to deal with natural 
hazards such as floods, earthquakes and windstorms. Interestingly, less developed nations do not 
necessarily experience more natural disaster events, but the death toll from disasters is on average 
higher in poorer nations (Kahn 2005). Economic scholars  explain these differences in 
vulnerability through the level of development (Kahn 2005,  Strömberg 2007), institutional 
quality (Kahn 2005), the level of democracy (e.g. Tavares 2004) or income inequality (Anbarci, 
Escaleras & Register 2005). The role of foreign aid, however, has only received minor attention 
so far (e.g. Strömberg 2007, Cohen & Werker 2008). 
 
In general, foreign aid can have two opposing effects on the recipient nation's disaster 
preparedness: First, aid flows can have a preventive effect by directly or indirectly improving a 
nation's preparedness against natural hazards. In recent years, a number of international initiatives 
emerged that try to implement disaster preparedness (e.g. awareness-building, installation of 
monitoring systems, structural measures) in overall aid policies (OCHA 2008). Additionally, 
general aid flows in infrastructure or social sector projects can create positive externalities for the 
recipient country's disaster preparedness. An improved telecommunication and transport system 
for example, facilitates early-warning and evacuation. Better housing structures make 
communities more resilient against the forces of nature. 
 
Second, while the natural hazard itself is an exogenous shock, the human reaction to such an 
event is driven by incentives as a result of millions of dollars yearly spent on disaster relief. 
Foreign aid received in the past might increase the predictability of ex-post relief and induce 
decision-makers to shirk responsibilities by reducing ex-ante protection activities. Such a reaction 
could result in higher financial losses and higher death tolls. For this reason, the disincentives 
induced by the large amount of relief are likely to further exacerbate the sustainable development 
of regions that are especially vulnerable to large scale disasters. The research focus in our paper 
is on this so called crowding-out effect of foreign aid. 
 
Ex-ante risk management strategies against large-scale disasters are generally not implemented 
by individuals voluntarily, since individuals' incentives for protection against disasters are 
distorted by a lack of interest and information as well as an underestimation of risk occurrence 
(Kunreuther & Pauly 2006). This public-good problem explains that the vast majority of 
protective measures (e.g. structural measures, building codes, zoning, early warning) are in the 
realm of governments and bureaucratic agencies. The ability to provide these public goods is 
influenced by the level of GDP (Kahn 2005), income inequality (e.g. Anbarci et al. 2005) or the 
level of heterogeneity among groups in society (e.g. Alesina & Drazen 1991). 
 
These factors can help to explain the large number of fatalities following natural disasters, 
especially in developing countries. To limit the destabilization following a disaster, ad-hoc 
disaster  relief from international organizations, national governments, non-governmental 
organizations as well as private donors is usually paid to the affected countries. Anecdotal 
evidence also suggests an increase in official development assistance (ODA) in order to ensure 
long term recovery from the disaster. In 1998 Hurricane "Mitch" devastated large parts of Central 3 
 
America. In Honduras alone the death toll reached 5,600 and the estimated financial losses were 
$ 3.8 billion. The international community responded to this disaster by increasing the official 
development assistance from $ 361 million (1997) to $ 1.7 billion (1999) and the annual ODA-
inflows still remain at a relatively higher level than prior to 1998 ($ 640 million) (Bermeo 2007). 
There is no doubt that international assistance after such a devastating event was strongly needed. 
However, these ex-post payments could set ex-ante incentives that crowd out the willingness of 
political agents to put effort in sufficient preventive action. Based on the conclusion from the 
Samaritan's Dilemma, the anticipation of charity in the case of a large-scale disaster, might 
induce governments to diminish protection (Buchanan 1975, Coate 1995), since "(…) current 
decisions of economic agents depend in part upon their expectations of future policy actions." ( 
p.474, Kydland  & Prescott 1977). Note, that the argumentation in this paper is limited to 
collective action, not including a crowding-out effect induced by individuals shirking 
responsibilities. A prominent example is the failure on the insurance market: Moral hazard and 
adverse selection present only a partial explanation for imperfections in the market for natural 
hazard insurance. Kunreuther (2000) defined the situation of distorted demand and insufficient 
supply on the market for natural hazard insurance as disaster syndrome. Individuals tend to 
underinsure because a) they underestimate the risk of low-probability-high-loss events and b) 
they expect financial relief by  the government or private charity. Private charity and 
governmental relief is a premium-free insurance against natural hazards. If a disaster occurs, 
individuals without market insurance are better off because they receive financial support from 
governmental relief programs. The theoretical model by Raschky & Weck-Hannemann (2007) 
shows that a higher degree of institutionalization of governmental relief or charity further 
decreases individual demand for insurance and increases the reliance on aid in a disaster 
situation. The phenomenon of charity hazard  (Browne & Hoyt 2000)  could also apply to 
international disaster assistance. 
 
This problem has already been identified in the foreign aid literature in another context as a 
consequence of producing disincentives through the provision of foreign aid (Gibson, Andersson, 
Ostrom & Shivakumar 2005). Foreign aid is often paid in order to close the financial gap between 
the required investment which is necessary to achieve a targeted growth rate and the available 
resources. The results of Easterly (1999) suggest that the provision of foreign aid based on the 
financial gap induces recipient countries to reduce savings and hence to increase the financial gap 
even further. In addition, the work by Cashel-Cordo & Craig (1990) and Khan & Hoshino (1992) 
provide evidence that international aid might have a negative effect on public-sector fiscal 
behavior in the recipient countries. In the natural hazard context, the theoretical model developed 
by Cohen & Werker (2008) suggests that the presence of ex-post relief can distort the relation of 
ex-ante protection to ex-post relief. However, the model we construct goes one step further by 
showing that the anticipation of foreign aid can result in a higher death toll from natural disasters. 
Moreover, to our knowledge, the connection between foreign aid and its influence on the 
effectiveness of preventive capacity has, so far, not been empirically analyzed. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section recapitulates the basic idea 
of Buchanan’s Samaritan’s Dilemma. Section 3 establishes a theoretical model to analyze the 
interaction between donor and recipient in the context of natural hazard prevention. Section 4 
presents our dataset. In section 5, we test the hypothesis on three different types of natural 
disasters. Sections 6 and 7 present the results and conclude with suggestions on the redeployment 
of foreign aid in order to minimize the adverse crowding-out effect. 4 
 
 
2 The Samaritan’s Dilemma 
 
Buchanan (1975) introduced the term Samaritan’s Dilemma in economics in order to show that 
altruism can induce adverse behavior of potential recipients based on the failure of the donor to 
act strategically. 
 
In order to get a better understanding of the pervading effect, we adapt the two-by-two game as 





Figure 1: The Active Samaritan's Dilemma 
  Recipient 
    High effort  Low effort 
Donor  No aid   2,2  1,1 
Aid  4,3  3,4 
 
 
The comparison of the pay-offs shows that the donor will always help, independent of the level of 
the recipient’s effort. This situation is refered to as the active Samaritan’s Dilemma. However, 
the donor would prefer the recipient putting in high effort (donor’s pay-off is 4) as compared to 
the recipient putting in low effort (donor’s pay off is 3). Since the recipient knows that the 
donor’s dominant strategy is to help, he will act strategically and respond by choosing a low level 
of effort. Hence, the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is the pay-off combination (3,4).   
 
Apart from the active Samaritan’s Dilemma, Buchanan constructed the situation of the passive 
Samaritan’s Dilemma, where helping is not the donor’s dominant strategy. In fact, the donor 
reacts to high effort by not helping and to low effort by helping.  
 
Figure 2: The Passive Samaritan's Dilemma 
    Recipient 
    High effort  Low effort 
Donor  No aid   4,2  1,1 
Aid  2,3  3,4 
 
Now, the donor prefers the situation where the recipient puts in high effort and the donor does not 
assist (donor’s pay off is 4), whereas the recipient prefers to put in low effort and to get assistance 
of the donor. The game has two equilibria, the pay off combinations (4,2) and (3,4). However, 
even in this situation, a strategic acting recipient chooses a low level of effort and forces the 
donor into pay-off combination (3,4).  
 
In both cases, the dilemma of the Samaritan is his exploitation due to his inability to commit not 
to help. Since the donor cannot reach the prefered pay-off, the burden is fully on his side. Also 
the Samaritan’s Dilemma is interlinked with moral hazard behavior it is important to distinguish 
between the two terms. Knowing or expecting to receive assistance from the donor induces the 
                                                 
1 See also Gibson et al. (2005) and Schmidtchen (1999) 5 
 
receipient to shirk responsibilities and to put in low effort, this is known as moral hazard. As we 
will see in the following the consequences of this behavior can be devastating for the recipient. 
 
In the following we will adapt the Samaritan’s Dilemma to an international context, with a donor 
and a recipient country. Note, that our analysis varies in two major points from Buchanan’s 
example. First, decision makers in our context are governments, not individuals. Hence, moral 
hazard behavior takes place on a collective level rather than on an individual level. Second, the 
games presented above are simultaneous games, whereas our case can be interpreted as a 
Stackleberg game (Coate 1995). 
 
3  The Model 
 
This section aims to construct a theoretical model, which allows the derivation of the hypothesis, 
necessary for the empirical analysis of a potential effect of foreign aid on the degree of 
protection. We first give an intuitive description of the theoretical story behind the model and 
then present the formal model itself. 
 
 
3.1  Intuitive description 
We imagine a world with a rich donor and a poor recipient country. The donor country receives 
utility from the recipient country's utility, which has resulted in foreign aid flows in the past. The 
recipient country is in danger of natural hazards. Past foreign aid flows can, in part, have a 
preventative effect on the vulnerability of the recipient country and increase the probability that 
wealth and human beings survive a natural hazard, if a) disaster preparedness measures are 
implemented in the foreign aid initiative of the past or if b) aid flows are used for measures which 
create positive externalities, hence contribute indirectly to improved disaster preparedness e.g. 
infrastructure. However, the recipient country itself can install protection as well, by imposing a 
proportional tax rate. This tax has two opposing effects on the expected utility of a representative 
person in the recipient country. On the one hand it contributes to a higher probability of surviving 
a disaster on the other hand it reduces consumption possibilities. Apart from the above described 
preventative effect, foreign aid flows of the past can have two negative effects on the probability 
of surviving, both of which are due to a reduction of the tax rate. First, the fraction of past foreign 
aid which contributes to a higher survival probability is interchangeable with the tax rate. Hence, 
aid receiving governments might decide to reduce the fungible tax rate and rely on the fraction of 
past foreign aid which contributes to prevention instead. In order to get a better idea of this 
problem of fungibility, imagine a government that strives to reach a certain level of protection. 
Since past foreign aid partly provides protection, the aspired level of protection can be obtained 
with a lower level of the tax rate. Second, foreign aid experiences in the past might increase the 
predictability of ex-post charity and induce the government of the recipient country to shirk 
responsibilities. Since a higher tax rate increases the survival probability, the need for disaster 
relief in case of a natural hazard is reduced. Hence, in the bad state the recipient country does not 
have an incentive to increase the tax rate because a higher level of protection reduces ex-post 
charity. In other words, the anticipation of foreign aid crowds out the tax rate. Moreover, in the 
good state, protection measures reduce the utility of a representative person in the recipient 
country by lessening consumption possibilities. Thus, the anticipation of disaster relief reduces 
the incentive to implement protection measures (crowding-out). The net outcome of the positive 
preventative effect and the two negative effects of past foreign aid can result in a lower survival 6 
 
probability if the negative effects outweigh the preventative effect. 
 
3.2  Formal model 
We assume a potential "donor country",  D and a "recipient country" R , each with identical 
individuals earning an income of  D Y  and  R Y  respectively  ) ( R D Y Y > . 
 
The recipient country is in danger of a natural hazard, which occurs with probability  p , 
1 0 ≤ ≤ p . There are two factors that can reduce the impact of natural hazards on society: First, 
the recipient country is assumed to have experienced foreign aid in the past. This transfer 
increases the utility of a representative individual in country R  by a) increasing the consumption 
possibilities and b) contributing -  directly or indirectly -  to a better risk prevention. In the 
following, we use the term preventive effect for the latter. Second, the government of country R  
can choose a level of protection, which is financed by a proportional tax rate τ   , with 
) 1 , 0 ( R Y ∈ τ  by maximizing the utility of a representative person. Hence, the probability that 
wealth (e.g. capital stock) as well as human beings survive a natural hazard is determined by the 
tax revenue  R Y τ  as well as the fraction, α , of foreign aid p.c., T , inducing the preventive effect, 
with 
 
  1 ≤ + = T Y q R α τ   (1) 
 
The idea to analyze survival probability stems from the model developed by Anbarci et al. (2005) 
and is, as we will demonstrate in section 4, important for our empirical applications.
2
α
 We assume 
that the fraction   is exogenous. The government's choice of τ  is subject to a trade-off: On the 
one hand a rise in the tax rate reduces the disposable income and therefore the consumption 
possibilities, on the other hand it increases the probability of surviving a natural hazard. To be 
more precise, there exists a threshold level, τ ~, below which the positive effect of a higher 
probability of surviving outweighs the utility reduction due to a lower level of consumption, 
whereas for  τ τ ~ >  the negative effect dominates. In the following we will focus on tax levels 
smaller than τ ~. In this relevant spectrum, we can observe a utility function with,  0 ) (
' > τ R U  and 
0
' ' < R U . Apart from the preventive effect, past foreign aid can have a negative effect on the 
survival probability due to the fungibility of the tax rate. This negative effect on the tax rate 











. In the following, we call 
this the fungibility effect. 
 
Country  D  receives utility from consumption C   and from country R 's utility  R U , 
R D U C U δ + = , with  0 > δ . A positive value of δ  can be the result of altruism as well as self-
interest of the donating country due to strategic considerations. The incorporation of the recipient 
country's utility level in the utility of the donating country could have a second effect on the 
                                                 
2Note that our model differs in three major points from the application of Anbarci et al. (2005). First, survival 
probability is not only determined by the tax revenue but also by foreign aid received in the past. Second, we do not 
account for income inequality within a country since this is not our main focus. Needless to say that we control for 
income inequality in the empirical application. Third, as mentioned above, we believe that the majority of protection 
measures in fact been used, are described by the characteristics of public goods and financed by taxes. 7 
 
recipient country's choice of the tax rate τ , if we account for ex-post relief in case of a disaster. 
That is, due to foreign aid experiences in the past, the government of the recipient country might 
anticipate the possibility of ex-post disaster relief ω  and interpret foreign aid experiences of the 
past as implicit insurance for the future. Hence, past foreign aid experiences do not only have a 
positive preventive and a negative fungibility effect on the survival probability, but also an 
adverse crowding-out effect. In the following, we will first derive the crowding-out of the tax rate 
τ  and second determine the net effect on survival probability q. 
 
Our model is mainly based on Coate (1995). However, there are two fundamental differences. 
First, while the analysis of Coate (1995) mainly focuses on a Samaritan's Dilemma problem 
between individuals on a national level, the aim of this work is to investigate the existence of the 
Samaritan's Dilemma on an international level, where the aid-receiving government shirks 
responsibilities. Second, Coate (1995) uses three groups of actors, namely two rich individuals, a 
poor individual and the government, with the latter trying to maximize the welfare of the rich by 
providing an ex-ante payment to the poor person. Hence, he assumes an ex-ante payment which 
is primary of strategic nature and aims to reduce the ex-post payment, which is the Samaritan's 
Dilemma problem of the rich. However, we assume that the ex-ante payment does not have any 
influence on the ex-post decision, because our focus is not to analyze how the ex-ante payment 
affects ex-post relief, but rather how it affects the level of protection chosen by the recipient 
country's government through the preventive as well as the two negative effects. 
 
The intuitive explanations illustrate that both the donor and the recipient country's behavior are 
relevant to derive the forces which impact the value of the tax rate τ   necessary  for the 
implementation of protection measures. Using backward induction, we first focus on the behavior 
of the donor country. Once, the bad state for the recipient country arises and given the level of the 
tax rate τ , the reaction function of the rich country is 
 
                            max  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ω α τ δ ω + − + − + − − q T Y U T Y R D 1 1   (2) 
 
with  T Y q R α + = . The optimal ex-post emergency aid is implicitly defined by the following 
first-order-condition, which states that the marginal benefit of the donor country, which results 
from the higher utility of the recipient country, must equal the marginal costs of the donor 
country due to a lower level of consumption. 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 1 1 1
' = + + − + − ω α τ α τ δ T Y T Y U R R   (3) 
 
In order to derive how the donating country's choice of ex-post aid adjusts to changes of the poor 














  (4) 
 
The denominator of the expression is negative if we assume that the impact of the ex-post 
transfer on the utility is comparable to the impact of income. A given level of transfer induces 
increases in the utility level, but the effect is smaller for higher levels of initial utility. 8 
 
 
The sign of the nominator is now essential for the determination of the adjustment of the donating 
country's ex-post transfer to variations of the tax rate undertaken by the recipient country's 
government. A positive nominator would imply that a rise of the tax rateτ  would increase the 
marginal utility of the ex-post transfer (prevention and relief are complements), whereas a 
negative nominator would suggest that an increase in the tax rate would lead to a decrease of the 
marginal utility of the ex-post transfer (prevention and relief are substitutes). If the increase of the 
tax rate has no influence on the marginal utility of the ex-post transfer the nominator reaches the 
value of zero. Cohen & Werker (2008) point out the importance of this distinction: Prevention 
and ex-post relief being complements would imply that the donating country would increase the 
level of aid for higher levels of protection. In contrast, a substitutability of prevention and aid, 
suggests that the donating country reacts on higher levels of protection by cutting the level of ex-
post relief. We believe that both the tax rate and the ex-post payment increase the ability to cope 
with the potential consequences of natural hazards and that these contributions are largely 
substitutable, since, in the majority of cases, relief is even productive when protection measures 
are not implemented. Hence, given the substitutability of prevention and aid, the expression 
above is negative and states that the donor country will reduce the level of ex-post relief for 
increasing values of τ . 
 
The government of the recipient country is assumed to maximize the expected utility of a 
representative consumer by taking into account the donor country's reaction function (4). 
 
max  ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) α τ τ ω α τ α τ − + − − + + + − + − = 1 1 1 1 1 T Y U p T Y T Y pU EU R R R R   (5) 
 
We first analyze how changes in the tax rate τ  affect the recipient country's utility in the bad 
state. For  0 > ω , increases in the value of the tax rate which contribute to a higher level of 
protection have no influence on the recipient country's utility in the bad state, since higher tax 
rates will, ceteris paribus, increase the survival probability and hence reduce the need for ex-post 
charity. The anticipation of foreign aid is perfectly crowding-out the tax rate τ , necessary for 
protection measures. In the good state however, protection measures reduce the utility of the 
recipient country, since the tax rate reduces the disposable income without contributing to a 
higher probability of surviving. Thus, allowing for the possibility of ex-post charity, provides an 
incentive for the aid receiving country to reduce protective measures (crowding-out effect). 
 
The survival probability q in the bad state is determined by the positive preventive effect and the 
two negative effects. 
 
 






















  (6) 
 
From equation (6) we can see that foreign aid received in the past will result in a lower survival 
probability, if the sum of crowding-out and fungibility effect outweighs the preventive effect. 
 
4  The Data 9 
 
 
We test the propositions of our theoretical model on three different types of natural disasters: 
storms, floodings and earthquakes. Table 1 provides an overview of the countries in each disaster 
sub-sample. Our sample of nations is very similar to the sample applied in Kahn (2005)
3
We compiled our dataset from a number of sources
. In their 
empirical analysis of the impact of disasters on long-term growth, Skidmore & Toya (2002) point 
out the importance to distinguish between different types of disasters. They argue that climatic 
disasters (e.g. storms, floods) are more easily forecast and therefore evacuation or taking cover is 
easier. In comparison, geologic disasters (e.g. earthquakes) are harder to predict. The former are 
more of a threat to property while the latter type of disasters are a threat to both property and life. 
They find that climatic disasters have a positive impact on long-run growth, while geologic 
disasters decrease growth in the long-run. 
 
 [Table 1 about here]  
 
Apart from the differences in the effect on economic development, different types of natural 
hazards require different forms of protective measures. Although activities in natural hazard 
management show common features (e.g. public good character of enforcing zoning and building 
codes) they might differ in terms of affordability and duration. For example, the construction of 
earthquake resistant buildings is very cost-intensive and cannot be afforded by the majority of 
individuals living in developing countries. Forecasts for storms, cyclones or other climatological 
events are often provided by international agencies and communicated to national governments. 
If these governments forward a warning to the people at risk, lifes can be saved at relatively low 
costs. Therefore, we build three subsamples for each type of natural hazard instead of simply 
pooling observations from all natural hazards. 
 
4: The data on disaster victims, major disaster, 
magnitude and the number of people effected are taken from the most comprehensive data set on 
disasters, the EM-DAT by the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) in 
Brussels. EM-DAT has collected around 12,000 reports of different disasters, such as floods, 
storms, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, landslides as well as man-made disasters. A natural 
disaster has to fulfill at least one of the following criteria in order to be included in the database: 
10 or more people reported killed, 100 people reported affected, declaration of a state of 
emergency, call for international assistance. Therefore, disasters that occurred in thinly populated 
areas are not included in the database and in the analysis. Information on the magnitude of storms 
(wind speed in kph) and earthquakes (Richter scale) also stems from this database. Data on the 
magnitude of major flood events (i.e. flooded area in km )  are  only available for a small 
number of flood disasters in the dataset. We therefore obtained historical data on precipitation 
from the Global Historical Climatology Network by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA). The data is collected from thousands of land stations. The earliest entry 
of a country's monthly mean precipitation ranges back to 1697 (United Kingdom). We used the 
number of months in year   and country   when precipitation was larger than one standard 
deviation above the long-term mean of precipitation in a given month as an additional 
explanatory variable in our estimations. 
                                                 
3We excluded Israel and Egypt from our sample due to these countries' special position in U.S. foreign aid policy 
(see Alesina & Dollar 2000). 
4See Table 17 for a description of the data and the sources´. 10 
 
 
Data for our main variable of interest, foreign aid p. c., stem from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI). Although EM-DAT provides figures on international disaster assistance for 
some major earthquake events, there is no comprehensive collection on financial disaster aid that 
compiled such data in a concise manner. The study by stroemberg07a used data on U.S. disaster 
assistance and its determinants. In contrast, we assume that expectations about international 
disaster relief are formed by general aid dependency. Therefore we use figures on overall 
development aid. National data on real GDP per capita and openness for trade are taken from the 
Penn World Table Version 6.2. Regarding data on income inequality, one could consider the 
largest collection of data on Gini coefficients is the World Income Inequality Database (WIID, 
2000). This data has been already used in the empirical analysis on disaster victims by Strömberg 
(2007). The problem with measuring income inequality over time and between countries is that 
the concepts and units of income change thus raising questions on the consistency and quality of 
the data used Strömberg (2007). To circumvent potential problems and biases, Grün & Klasen 
(2003) perform a regression-based adjustment to make the Gini-coefficients more comparable. 
We use the data from that study for our analysis. 
 
Our measure for institutional quality was compiled by Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, (2008) for 
the Worldbank. Institutional quality is defined via six dimensions of governance: Control of 
Corruption, i.e. the extent to which political power is misused for private benefits. Governmental 
effectiveness, i. e. the quality and credibility of public and civil service and the independence 
from political pressure. Political stability, i.e. the probability that the current government will be 
overthrown by a coup d' tat. Regulatory quality, i.e. the government's ability to design and 
enforce sound regulations and promote private sector development. Rule of law, i.e. the 
protection of property rights and the quality of contract enforcement, the police and the courts. 
Voice and accountability, i.e. freedom of expression and association as well as the possibility to 
actively participate in the selection of the government. Our second proxy measure for 
institutional quality is a country's democracy level. We use the Polity 2 variable, which ranges 
between -10 (autocratic) and 10 (democratic). Information on a nation's colonial background is 
provided by Correlates of War 2 Project (2008). 
 
As additional controls, we introduce the general mortality risk from each natural disaster. A 
recent study by Columbia University and the World Bank (Dilley, Chen, Deichmann, Lerner-
Lam, Arnold, Agwe, Buys, Kjekstad,  Lyon & Yetman 2005)  uses spatial data on historical 
disaster occurrence and population density and constructs a measure of the geographical 
distribution of mortality risk from natural disasters worldwide. In the appendix Figures 3, 5 and 7 
show the regions with storm, flood and earthquake mortality risk in the world, respectively and 
Figures 4, 6 and 8 are maps focused on each risk in Asia in order to get a better idea of the 
resolution of the data. The darker the grid cells, the larger the mortality risk on a 10-point scale. 
We use this GIS-data and combine it with a shape file of national boundaries to calculate a 
country's mean exposure to disaster mortality. Data for additional geographical controls (latitude 
and elevation) stem from the dataset provided by (Kahn 2005). Table 2 reports the mean, 
standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the variables in the estimated cross-section 
models for each sub-sample. 
 




5  Empirical Strategy 
 
Based on the propositions put forward by our theoretical model and the specification applied by 
Kahn (2005), we derive the following reduced-form specification for our baseline estimates: 
 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 4 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 0 jt jt t j t j ijt POPDENS Ln POP LnLn GDP Ln AID Ln DEATH β β β β β + + + + = − −      
                      j j ijt jt LATITUDE NATHAZRISK MAGNITUTE OPEN 8 7 6 5 β β β β + + + +                  
                      ijct c ijt j ELEVATION ε υ η β + + + + 9                                                                         (7) 
  
Our dependent variable is the number of deaths,  ijt DEATH , at event i in country  j at year t. Our 
main variable of interest is foreign aid in period  1 − t  per capita, Ln  ) ( 1 , − t j AID . This variable a) 
accounts for the fungibility effect of past foreign aid and b) serves as our empirical proxy for the 
crowding-out effect i.e. the amount of anticipated ex-post aid that might crowd out national 
collective hazard management activity. To account for a country's level of development and its 
general ability to install protective measures we include GDP per capita. In order to reduce 
potential reversed causality between disaster fatalities and income we use the first lag of GDP 
p.c., Ln  ) ( 1 , − t j GDP . We expect that richer countries suffer c. p. less deaths from natural disasters. 
In contrast to general belief, the correlation between GDP p. c. and   AID p. c. in each of our 
three sub-samples is moderate (between -0.104 and -0.152). This is in line with the results of 
empirical studies (e.g. Frey & Schneider, 1986, Alesina & Dollar 2000) that identify political and 
strategic considerations as the driving forces behind foreign aid. 
 
To account for a nation's size and density of population we introduce the natural log of 
population,  Ln  ) ( jt POP , and the natural log of population density, Ln  ( ) jt POPDENS , 
respectively.  Gassebner, Keck & Teh (2009)  show a negative relationship between the 
occurrence of disasters and a nation's trade volume. Alesina & Dollar (2000) find that bilateral 
aid flows are positively related to a nation's openness for trade. To control for potential spurious 
correlation that might stem from this interrelationship, we include a nation's openness for trade, 
jt OPEN , in our specification. 
 
Apart from these socio-economic variables, the main explanatory factors for disaster fatalities are 
a disaster's magnitude, and additional climatic, geographical and topographical factors. All else 
equal, more powerful disasters should kill more people. We include wind speed measured in 
kilometers per hour as a magnitude variable for our storm sub-sample, the number of months per 
year  t in the country  j , with a monthly precipitation that is one standard deviation above the 
long time precipitation mean in country  j  for our flood sub-sample and the Richter scale for the 
earthquake sub-sample. 
 
Nations that are more exposed to natural disasters could also be the subject of more international 
aid contributions. Thus, we control for a nation's exposure to each disaster type via a proxy 
variable. Using GIS-data on the mortality risk and a shape file of a country's national boundaries 
we are able to construct the mean mortality risk from each disaster type for each nation, 12 
 
j NATHAZRISK . The expectations on the country's exposure to disasters are ambiguous. On the 
one hand, a higher ex-ante risk could be an indicator for more knowledge and better precaution. 
On the other hand, these proxies could indicate a higher magnitude of events and thus increase 
the number of fatalities. As a second indicator we use latitude, which accounts for possibility that 
the occurrence and intensity of climatic disasters might be correlated with their distance to the 
equator. As a third geographical indicator we use the mean elevation of a country. We also 
include continent-specific fixed effects,  c υ , and a time trend, η, (both in accordance to the 
specification by Kahn (2005).  ijct ε  is the error term. 
 
The dependent variable,  ijt DEATH , is a discrete, strictly positive count variable. Using simple 
ordinary least squares (OLS) with the underlying distributional assumption of a normally 
distributed continuous variable could result in biased estimates. Kahn (2005) log-transformed the 
dependent variable to overcome this problem. An alternative way is to assume that the data are 
Poisson distributed and use Poisson regression models. However, if the conditional mean and the 
variance function of the dependent are not equal, these estimators can overestimate the 
significance. A more flexible approach is the negative binomial model, which will be applied in 
this paper. 
 
The empirical estimation is complicated by the fact that the relationship between disaster 
fatalities and past foreign aid are influenced simultaneously by omitted factors. We try to 
circumvent this problem by applying an instrumental variable (IV) estimator. Our instruments for 
past foreign aid are motivated by two seminal contributions in the field of development 
economics: The first instrument is a country's bilateral political alignement with the USA, 
measured by an updated version of Gartzke's affinity index (Voeten and Merdzanovic 2009). This 
index is constructed using voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly. The index 
ranges between 1 (recipient and USA  always voted the same way) and -1 (recipient and 
USAnever voted the same way). The choice of our second set of instruments refers to work by 
Fink & Redaelli (2009). They find that oil exporting countries are also more likely to receive 
international emergency aid. We therefore  include the level of country  s j′   oil reserves and 
natural gas production as additional instruments. 
 
In addition, we perform a number of robustness tests: First we control for the influence of 
institutional quality. Kahn (2005) already suggests that better institutional quality serves as an 
insurance against mortality risk from natural disasters. We therefore expect the sign to be 
negative. The second set of estimates looks at the effect of aid from different donor nations. After 
that, we examine the additional influence of factors that might increase the anticipation of aid. As 
already mentioned, Alesina & Dollar (2000) showed that former colonies are c. p. more likely to 
receive foreign aid. We therefore estimate alternative specifications where we control for these 
factors and the interaction with lagged aid. 
 
The studies by Anbarci et al. (2005) and Kahn (2005) suggest that a country's income inequality 
jt GINI  is an impediment for collective actions and might increase the death toll. In contrast, 
Eisensee & Strömberg (2007) who uses the UN-WIDER GINI data, does not find any significant 
relationship between inequality and disaster fatalities. Therefore, the effect of the GINI -variable 
is in principle ambiguous. We run additional specifications that include income inequality of 13 
 
country  j  in year t as additional robustness checks. 
 
In line with the empirical strategy by Kahn (2005), our second set of estimates analyzes the 
determinants of the annual national death toll from each of the three different natural hazards. 
The EM-DAT disaster dataset only includes major disasters that have exceeded a certain 
threshold in magnitude (e.g. number of fatalities, state of emergency). A nation could experience 
a natural disaster but a sufficient amount of protective measures can limit the overall losses and 
fatalities and thus prohibit the event being included in the dataset. Constructing a panel dataset 
allows us to analyze this first-stage process as well and use this information as an additional 
control in a second stage regression of the disaster fatalities. 
 
Using the negative binomial model would assume that the observations with zero death-counts 
are generated by the same underlying process. This might not apply to our analysis. A zero 
outcome in the death count can arise from two regimes: Either no disaster took place (regime 1) 
or a large scale disaster took place and protective measures prevented any fatalities (regime 2). 
We therefore apply a zero-inflated negative binomial model (ZINB) which allows for 
overdispersion in the dependent variable and treats the zero outcomes of the dependent variable 
different from the positive counts. The model combines a binary variable  i c  with a standard 
count variable  i y
*  such that the observed variable is given by 
 
                                       (8) 
 
The probability that  1 = c  is denoted by  i ω . We apply the following probit model to estimate the 
influence of covariates  i z  on  i ω . 
 
  ( ) γ ω i i z Φ =   (9) 
 
The corresponding log-likelihood function is given by 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ∑
=
+ ′ − + Φ =
0
exp ln ln ln
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i i x z l α β α α γ  
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            ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ∑
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exp 1 ln exp ln γ α β β   (10)   
 
The first stage probit model captures the process governing that a potential deadly disaster takes 
place in country  j  at time t. The second stage estimates the death count once a disaster has taken 
place by applying a negative binomial estimator. 
 
 
6  Results 
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The first set of results for fatalities from storms, floods and earthquakes is presented in Table 3. 
Our hypothesis, that lagged foreign aid, Ln ( ) 1 , − t j AID , has an increasing effect on the number of 
disaster fatalities is only confirmed in the storm sub-sample. The results are robust if the mean of 
annual aid of the preceding 3 years, Ln( ) 1 . 3 − −t j AID yr , is taken instead of the first lag of aid 
(column 3.2). The results for floods and earthquakes neither confirm nor reject our hypothesis. 
The coefficients of the lagged aid as well as the 3-year-mean aid variable do have a positive sign 
for flood fatalities and a negative sign for earthquake fatalities, but they are not significantly 
different from zero. These results indicate that the negative effects of aid might be relevant for 
wind-storm disasters and to a certain extent for floods, but not for earthquakes. The differences 
between the disaster sub-samples seems to be connected to the choice of our empirical proxy. As 
already mentioned, foreign aid can have a preventive as well as a fungibility and crowding-out 
effect. The results from the storm and flood sub-sample suggest that the negative effects 
outweigh the prevention effect while we find some indication that the relationship is vice versa in 
the case of earthquakes. 
 
Table 4 summarizes the results of the IV estimates, where we instrumented lagged aid with 
lagged values of country j’s bilateral political affinity with the USA, its oil reserves and natural 
gas production. The coefficient for lagged aid is again positive and significant for the storm 
subsample. While the sign of the coefficient changes in the flood sample and stays negative in the 
earthquake sample. Again, the estimates with the floods and earthquakes subsamples do not yield 
significant results for the lagged aid variable. However, the signs of the aid coefficients are 
positive in all three subsamples. 
 
Kahn (2005) showed that nations with better institutions suffer less disaster fatalities and there is 
a wide discussion in the aid-literature on the effect of institutions on development aid. We control 
for this interrelationship in Tables 5, 6 and 7 for each disaster-type separately. The results for the 
storm sample in Table 6 show that the lagged aid variable is still robust after including various 
measures of institutional quality. Apart from the measures for democracy,  jt DEMOCRACY , none 
of the institutional variables appear to have an significant effect on the number of storm fatalities. 
The coefficients of lagged aid in the flood sample, change sign, while the coefficients in the 
earthquakes sub-sample do not change. Again the coefficients of lagged aid in the floods and 
earthquakes sub-samples are not significantly different from zero. Interestingly, the majority of 
institutional variables appear to have a large and significant mitigative effect against floods and 
earthquakes. 
 
In Table 8 we analyze the effects of aid from different, major donor countries (France, Germany, 
Japan, United Kingdom and USA). We only report the coefficients  for aid. The sign of the 
coefficients of lagged aid do not change, however, in the storm sub-sample the effect of the aid-
variable from individual donor countries is not significant, while the effect for floods and 
earthqukes becomes significant. 
 
These results once again point out the importance of distinguishing between different types of 
disasters and indicate that future research should have a closer look at the variations in forms of 
development by different donor nations. The remaining coefficients of lagged aid in the 
subsamples are not significantly different from zero. Table 9 adds a dummy for the colonial 
background and an interaction term with foreign aid to the baseline specification. Lagged foreign 15 
 
aid is no longer significant for the storm sub-sample, neither is the colony dummy nor the 
interaction term. In contrast to our expectations, we find some evidence that aid-flows in former 
colonies (interaction term between lagged aid and U.K. colony for the storm subsample and 
interaction term between French colony and lagged aid for the flood sub-sample) actually reduces 
the number of flood victims. These results could indicate that increased aid-flows due to colonial 
history had direct or indirect effects on disaster preparedness that outweigh the (even higher) 
crowding-out effect of aid-flows to former colonies. 
 
Table 10 introduces an interaction term between the lagged aid and the institutional quality 
variable. As before, there is mixed evidence of the effect of aid on disaster preparedness. 
However, there is a general trend observable that the interaction term of lagged aid and 
institutional quality has a decreasing effect on disaster fatalities. These results contribute to the 
discussion on the relationship between institutional quality and aid effectiveness (Burnside & 
Dollar 2000, Easterly, Levine &  Roodman  2004)  In accordance with the discussion in this 
literature, our results appear to be rather fragile and only have explorative character. Our results 
are robust to the inclusion of the GINI-variable. The GINI-coefficient itself does not appear to 
have a significant effect on the number of disaster fatalities. 
 
In the next step we reproduce our results using ZINB (Tables 11-17 in the appendix). Again the 
results differ between the sub-samples. Lagged aid seems to have an increasing effect on disaster 
fatalities (at least at the 10 % significance level) in the case of storms. Regarding the estimates 
for the flood sub-sample we find an interesting pattern: in the first stage probit, lagged aid 
appears to increase the probability that the number of deaths from floods is positive. However, 
the second stage suggests that aid has a mitigating effect on the total number of flood deaths. The 
estimates using the earthquake sub-sample show a similar pattern but the coefficient of aid in the 
second stage is not significant. We interpret these results as follows: Foreign aid flows reduce the 
overall extent of flood and earthquake disasters. Nevertheless, aid can also crowd-out the 
incentives of governments to install preventive measures or enact zoning or building codes that 
increase the probability of survival or, in other words, reduce the probability that a deadly 
disaster occurs. 
 
This general pattern persists throughout the ZINB estimates. Reproducing the estimates with 
institutional quality, lagged aid and the interaction between aid and institutions shows that the 
overall effect of aid in either sub-sample is reduced. While in the flood subsample the lagged aid 
coefficient is positive the interaction term between institutional quality and aid is negative. For 
floods and earthquakes the relationship is mainly vice versa. The results need to be interpreted 
with caution as some of the estimates did not converge. 
 
7  Concluding Remarks 
 
Based on the results of the existing literature on the socio-economic determinants of a country's 
vulnerability against catastrophic events (Anbarci et al. 2005, Kahn 2005), we analyzed the effect 
of foreign aid dependence on the recipient country's protection against large-scale disasters. Our 
theoretical model suggests that foreign aid can have both negative and postive effects. If the sum 
of fungibility and crowding-out effect outweighs the preventive effect, foreign aid in previous 
periods will decrease incentives to provide protective measures and ultimately lead to a higher 
death toll from natural disasters. The empirical section of our study provides some evidence for 16 
 
charity hazard on international level. Estimates using data on major storm events show that 
increases in the level of past foreign aid imply higher death tolls resulting from natural disasters. 
For flood disasters and major earthquakes we find some evidence that past foreign aid can 
increase the probability that the death toll from disasters is non-zero, however, it also reduces the 
total number of deaths from disasters. As we are using lagged foreign aid as an empirical proxy 
for anticipated disaster aid, it is not possible to disentangle the two negative effects and the 
positive (side-)effects of foreign aid on infrastructure and disaster  management. The major 
implication for future research is that an analysis of the effects of aid on natural hazard 
management largely differs across types of disasters and that a better empirical proxy for the 
anticipation of international disaster aid is needed. 
 
The major policy implication of our results is not a call for a reduction of foreign aid but rather a 
call for rethinking strategies for international assistance and redesigning existing aid programs. 
The design of transfers, foreign aid in particular, has been drawing attention in economics for a 
long time (e.g. Nichols 1982, Besley & Coate 1991, Coate 1995, Gahvari & Mattos 2007). The 
major findings of these articles are that unrestricted transfers induce people to diminish ex-ante 
protection activities (charity hazard) and to shirk responsibilities. In order to avoid these 
problems "the tying of aid" (Jepma 1991) through in-kind transfers and conditional transfers, is of 
interest. In fact, the theoretical model of Coate (1995) shows that in-kind transfers (e.g. provision 
of insurance) and conditional transfers can overcome the adverse effects of altruism. Applied to 
the natural hazard context, this result would suggest that the provision of ex-ante in-kind transfers 
(e.g. building of a dike, early warning system for earthquakes) to countries at risk could reduce 
the dilemma situation. Since this form of transfer is less fungible, the possibility of misuse is 
limited allowing for a higher probability of surviving natural disasters.  
 
Although in-kind and restricted transfers reduce the above mentioned weaknesses of unrestricted 
aid, they are criticized for causing dead-weight-losses due to a lack of information about 
recipients' preferences. Moreover, due to asymmetric information, even the provision of in-kind 
transfers does not ensure the protection of the most vulnerable people. However, the valuation of 
in-kind and cash transfers in the case of natural hazards might be  somehow different, since 
mitigation activities do not only require financial capital but also expertise. Since developing 
countries in particular lack this expertise, unrestricted aid will not necessarily lead to efficient 
targeting. Although alternative adaptation strategies require future research, the impression at 
first glance is that ex-ante in-kind transfers could be a possible solution in case of natural hazards, 
since mitigation activities are likely to reduce the extent of disasters and the need for ex-post 
relief. A lower vulnerability to catastrophic events could reduce (at least to a certain extent) 
developing countries' dependency on foreign aid and contribute to a more independent 
development of these countries. As economic research on the efficiency of in-kind transfers is far 
from satisfying, it requires a better understanding of the incentives created by in-kind transfers 
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Table 1: List of countries and number of natural disasters 
  
  Country   Storms  Floods   Earthquakes   Country   Storms  Floods   Earthquakes 
 Argentina    3   28  1    Mozambique    2   8   0 
Australia    18   27  3    Nepal    0    19  3 
Austria    0   7   0    New Zealand    3   23  1  
Bangladesh    33   35  3    Nicaragua    3   4   3 
Bolivia    0    15  2    Nigeria    0    14  0 
Brazil    0    50  1    Pakistan    3   24  14  
Canada    4   11  0    Panama    1   0  2 
Chile    0    14   4    Papua New Guinea    2    4   6  
China    21   103   57    Peru    0    25   16 
Colombia    1   27  9    Philippines    47   44   10  
Costa Rica    2   8   8    Portugal    1   5   0  
Denmark    1   0   0    South Africa    2   16   3  
Ecuador    0    8  8    Spain    4   11   1  
El Salvador    2   2   4    Sri Lanka    1   28   0  
France    5   28   0    Switzerland    2   5   0 
Greece   0   6  15   Tanzania    0    14  1 
Guatemala    1   4   7    Thailand    1   34   0  
Honduras    3   11  2    Turkey    1    17  19  
India    15   95   13    United Kingdom    10   13   1  
Indonesia   0    62  37    United States    34   90   18  
Iran    2   45  37    Venezuela    1   15   6  
Ireland    1   2  0    Vietnam    8   7   0 
Italy   0  0  10   TOTAL   289    1109   365 
Japan    14   14  20  
Kenya    0    5  1 
Korea, South    6   17   0 
Madagascar    11   2   0 
Malawi    0   11  1 
Malaysia    1  13  0  
























Table  2: Descriptive statistics 
  Obs.  Variable  Mean   Std. Dev.  Min.    Max. 
 Storms 
 FATALITIES   289    226.723   1232.926    0.000   14600.000 
  AID p. c.   289   0.792   3.770   -1.022    45.062 
  GDP p. c.   289   10082.490   10136.190   648.365   34364.500 
 GINI   289   43.056   9.049   25.216   64.796 
 POP (in tsd.)   289    217809.900   344382.700   2745.429    1271085.000 
 POPDENS   289    230.988   279.104   1.976   1024.392 
 OPEN   289   49.772   30.740   12.672   218.796 
 MAGNITUDE   289   155.886   57.410   45.000   300.000 
NATHAZ - RISK    289   3.566   3.187   0.000   7.855 
 LATITUDE    289   28.085   13.582   2.165   61.063 
 ELEVATION   289   601.594   449.689   34.259   1839.950 
Floods 
 FATALITIES   1109    125.649   956.011    0.000   30000.000 
  AID p. c.   1109    0.758   3.079   -1.023    33.328 
  GDP p. c.   1109    7496.065    8185.186   389.963   35107.520 
 GINI   1109    44.203   8.990   25.216    64.796 
 POP (in tsd.)   1109   249678.700   372010.200   2299.124    1271085.000 
 POPDENS   1109    131.481   162.153   1.943    972.416 
 OPEN   1109   45.678   29.358   9.275   228.874 
 MAGNITUDE   1109   1.654   1.691   0.000    8.000 
NATHAZ - RISK    1109   4.282    2.528    0.026   9.854 
 LATITUDE    1109    25.347   14.976   0.422   61.063 
 ELEVATION   1109    778.552   552.312   85.476   2565.382 
 Earthquakes 
 FATALITIES   365    381.715   2637.994   0.000   40000.000 
  AID p. c.   365    1.552   5.562   -0.005   40.578 
  GDP p. c.   365    5907.357   5978.683    482.528   35107.520 
 GINI   365    44.055   8.756   25.216   64.196 
 POP (in tsd.)   365    45.020   25.089   10.418   214.423 
 POPDENS   365    280543.200   420309.300   2434.262   1271085.000 
 OPEN   365    109.141   114.505   1.976   989.455 
 MAGNITUDE   365    6.159    0.881   4.000   8.000 
NATHAZ - RISK    365    2.279   2.001   0.000   7.369 
 LATITUDE    365    25.274   14.519   0.422   53.887 
 ELEVATION   365    980.628   545.394   85.476    2565.382 
  













Table  3: The determinants of disaster fatalities 
   Storms   Floods    Earthquakes  
  3.1   3.2   3.3   3.4   3.5   3.6 
  Ln(AIDj,t-1)  0.794**    0.098    -0.960 
  (0.347)    (0.250)    (0.753) 
Ln(3yr. AIDj,t-1)    0.761**    0.051    -0.991 
    (0.308)    (0.164)    (0.744) 
 Ln(GDP j,t-1)   -0.552***  -0.548***  -0.135  -0.192  -0.951**  -0.969** 
  (0.137)  (0.136)  (0.152)  (0.120)  (0.479)  (0.460) 
 Ln(POP jt)  0.010  0.032  0.307***  0.317***  -0.997  -0.998 
  (0.307)  (0.313)  (0.116)  (0.116)  (1.120)  (1.052) 
 Ln(POPDENSjt)  -0.002  -0.006  -0.009  0.088  0.007  -0.006 
  (0.285)  (0.282)  (0.232)  (0.192)  (0.985)  (0.920) 
OPENjt  0.003  0.003  -0.012***  -0.013***  -0.032***  -0.035*** 
  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.012)  (0.011) 
MAGNITUDEijt   0.012***  0.012***  0.420***  0.430***  2.283***  2.266*** 
  (0.003)   (0.003)  (0.126)  (0.126)  (0.281)  (0.282) 
 NATHAZ – RISKj   -0.179**  -0.179**  0.168  0.129  0.060  0.092  
  (0.075)  (0.074)  (0.168)   (0.091)  (0.327)  (0.292) 
LATITUDEj  -0.014  -0.014  -0.034***  -0.028**  0.019  0.017 
  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.091)  (0.080) 
ELEVATIONj  -0.001***  -0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  -0.001**  -0.001** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
 Obs.  292  292  1125  1125  367  367 
Log pseudolikelihood  -1388.273  -1388.273  -5013.813  -5077.955  -1445.147  -1444.850  
Prob> χ
2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   Notes: Negative binomial estimates. Dependent variable is DEATHijt. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted 
for clustering on country-level. Continent dummies, time trend and constant term included in all specifications. ***, 
**, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.     




Table  4: The determinants of disaster fatalities - IV-estimates  
  Storms  Floods  Earthquakes 
  Ln(AIDj,t-1)  1.270**  0.416  1.280 
  (0.623)  (0.617)  (1.822) 
 Ln(GDP j,t-1)   -0.190*  0.101  -0.330 
  (0.111)  (0.141)  (0.232) 
 Ln(POP jt)  0.177  0.371**  0.752 
  (0.311)  (0.157)  (0.760) 
 Ln(POPDENSjt)  -0.118  -0.010  -1.334* 
  (0.237)  (0.131)  (0.779) 
OPENjt  -0.000  -0.015***  -0.020** 
  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.008) 
MAGNITUDEijt   0.009***  -0.019  1.186*** 
  (0.002)  (0.023)  (0.168) 
 NATHAZ – RISKj   -0.100  0.145**  0.345* 
  (0.085)  (0.059)   (0.201) 
LATITUDEj  -0.042***  -0.031***  0.009 
  (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.029) 
ELEVATIONj  -0.001*  0.001***  -0.001 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
 Obs.  212  818  292 
Centered R²  0.418  0.340  0.213 
Prob> F  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Sargan Test  0.897  0.066  0.144 
Underid. Test  0.000  0.000  0.001 
Shea’s R²  0.419  0.114  0.061 
   Notes: IV-estimates. Dependent variable is Ln(1+DEATHijt). The first lags of 
Gartzke's affinity index with the USA, AFFINITY  USAj,t-1,  the country’s oil 
resources, OIL RESOURCESj,t-1 and natural gas production, GAS PRODj,t-1, were 
used as additional instruments for Ln(AIDj,t-1). Continent dummies, time trend 
and constant term included in all specifications. ***, **, * indicate significance at 








Table 5: Storm fatalities and institutional quality 
     5.1   5.2   5.3   5.4   5.5   5.6  5.7 
  Ln(AIDj,t-1)  0.784**  0.817**  0.726**  0.833*  0.767**  0.772**  1.075*** 
  (0.342)  (0.353)  (0.307)  (0.442)  (0.332)  (0.329)  (0.345) 
Ln(GDP j,t-1)  -0.673***  -0.667***  -0.627***  -0.577***  -0.658***  -0.372**  -0.208* 
  (0.169)  (0.152)  (0.138)  (0.129)  (0.175)  (0.160)  (0.115) 
CORR CONTjt  0.474 
   (0.485)  
GOV EFFjt    0.389 
     (0.304)  
POL STABjt      0.532* 
      (0.202)  
REG QALjt        0.123 
         (0.572)  
RULE LAWjt          0.269 
           (0.419)  
VOICE ACCjt            -0.454 
             (0.373)  
DEMOCRACYjt              -0.116*** 
               (0.025)  
Ln(POP jt)  0.048  0.054  0.016  -0.001  -0.003  -0.081  -0.032 
  (0.315)  (0.307)  (0.322)  (0.296)  (0.308)  (0.295)  (0.209) 
Ln(POPDENSjt)  0.102  0.047  0.227  0.015  0.048  0.032  0.279 
  (0.236)  (0.250)  (0.262)  (0.282)  (0.260)  (0.246)  (0.170) 
 OPENjt  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.002  0.002  0.001  0.005 
  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005) 
 MAGNITUDEijt  0.012***  0.012***  0.013***  0.012***  0.012***  0.013***  0.012*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
 NATHAZ – RISKj  -0.200**  -0.178**  -0.208**  -0.189**  -0.168**  -0.188***  -0.225*** 
  (0.081)  (0.074)  (0.066)  (0.075)  (0.079)  (0.071)  (0.079) 
 LATITUDEj  -0.031  -0.027  -0.034**  -0.015  -0.020  -0.018  -0.037*** 
  (0.028)  (0.020)  (0.016)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.014)  (0.011) 
 ELEVATIONj  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.002***  -0.002*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
 Obs.  292  292  292  292  292  292  292 
Log pseudolikelihood  -1387.450  -1387.637  -1386.003  -1388.219  -1388.010  -1387.101   -1377.600 
Prob>χ
2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: Negative binomial estimates. Dependent variable is DEATHijt. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted 
for clustering on country-level. Continent dummies, time trend and constant term included in all specifications. ***, 
**, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.     




Table 6: Flood fatalities and institutional quality  
    6.1   6.2   6.3   6.4   6.5   6.6  6.7 
 Ln(AIDj,t-1)   -0.438   -0.334   -0.454   -0.371   -0.262   -0.334   -0.417 
   (0.287)   (0.273)   (0.366)   (0.266)   (0.279)   (0.307)   (0.352) 
Ln(GDP j,t-1)   -0.032   -0.004   -0.332    -0.144   -0.141   -0.131   -0.267  
  (0.130)   (0.154)   (0.175)   (0.147)   (0.134)   (0.146)   (0.154) 
CORR CONTjt   -1.183***  
   (0.321)  
GOV EFFjt    -1.014*** 
    (0.295)  
POL STABjt      0.216  
      (0.235)  
REG QALjt         -0.946** 
         (0.445)  
RULE LAWjt           -0.770*** 
           (0.153)  
VOICE ACCjt             -0.481* 
             (0.157)  
DEMOCRACYjt               -0.010 
               (0.024)  
Ln(POP jt)   0.268   0.378**   0.151   0.341*  0.367*   0.218   0.193 
  (0.163)   (0.189)   (0.209)   (0.174)   (0.170)    (0.171)   (0.197)  
Ln(POPDENSjt)   0.306   0.201   0.112   0.251   0.077   0.078   0.086 
  (0.304)   (0.261)   (0.299)   (0.290)   (0.277)   (0.273)   (0.292) 
 OPENjt   -0.007   0.006   -0.014***   -0.006   -0.010**   -0.013***  -0.012*** 
  (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.005)   (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.004) 
 MAGNITUDEijt   0.090**   0.107**   0.120**   0.091*   0.119**   0.135**   0.125** 
  (0.043)   (0.049)   (0.054)   (0.046)   (0.051)   (0.056)   (0.056) 
 NATHAZ – RISKj   0.077   0.109   0.169   0.151   0.192   0.229    0.184 
  (0.110)   (0.101)   (0.143)   (0.109)   (0.120)   (0.132)   (0.0141) 
 LATITUDEj  -0.001   -0.014   -0.048***   -0.033**   -0.023   -0.035**   -0.043*** 
  (0.017)   (0.015)   (0.018)   (0.013)   (0.015)   (0.015)   (0.016) 
 ELEVATIONj   0.001***   0.001***   0.001***   0.001***   0.001***   0.001***   0.001*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
 Obs.  1125  1125  1125  1125  1125  1125  1125 
Log pseudolikelihood  -5093.929  -5103.844  -5123.730  -5101.884  -5108.906  -5119.118   -5124.959 
Prob>χ
2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: Negative binomial estimates. Dependent variable is DEATHijt. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted 
for clustering on country-level. Continent dummies, time trend and constant term included in all specifications. ***, 
**, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.     




Table 7: Earthquake fatalities and institutional quality  
    7.1   7.2   7.3   7.4   7.5   7.6  7.7 
 Ln(AIDj,t-1)   -0.220   -0.524   -0.686   -0.275   -0.635   -1.028   -1.204** 
  (0.531)   (0.418)   (0.979)   (0.453)   (0.823)   (0.991)   (0.501) 
Ln(GDP j,t-1)   -0.372   -0.093   -0.413   -0.564*   -0.739   -0.970*   -0.981*** 
  (0.394)   (0.286)   (0.442)   (0.317)   (0.608)   (0.516)   (0.259) 
CORR CONTjt   -1.371   
  (0.738)  
GOV EFFjt     -1.999***  
     (0.503)  
POL STABjt       -1.226  
       (0.309)  
REG QALjt         -1.376***  
         (0.411)  
RULE LAWjt           -0.550  
           (0.727)  
VOICE ACCjt             0.099  
             (0.490)  
DEMOCRACYjt               0.128*** 
               (0.027) 
Ln(POP jt)   -0.258   0.112   -0.849   0.462   -0.718   -0.998   -0.947* 
  (0.686)   (0.462)   (0.656)   (0.703)   (1.260)   (1.084)   (0.550) 
Ln(POPDENSjt)   -0.210   -0.041   0.286   -0.222   -0.021   0.004   -0.003 
  (0.565)   (0.426)   (0.681)   (0.577)   (1.031)   (0.941)   (0.489) 
 OPENjt   -0.036***   -0.029***  -0.028***   -0.023**   -0.034**   -0.031**   -0.020* 
  (0.011)   (0.009)   (0.010)   (0.009)   (0.011)   (0.014)   (0.011) 
 MAGNITUDEijt   2.174***   2.164***   2.210***   2.269***   2.272***   2.282***   2.332*** 
  (0.302)   (0.307)   (0.295)   (0.300)   (0.291)   (0.281)   (0.247) 
 NATHAZ – RISKj   0.198   0.159   -0.065   0.633**   0.095   0.064   -0.042 
  (0.223)   (0.169)   (0.330)   (0.248)   (0.340)   (0.314)   (0.226) 
 LATITUDEj   0.026   0.021   0.046   -0.020   0.023   0.018   0.014 
  (0.064)   (0.040)   (0.058)   (0.052)   (0.094)   (0.086)   (0.040) 
 ELEVATIONj   -0.002**   -0.002***   -0.001**   -0.001*   -0.002**   -0.001   -0.001 
  (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001) 
 Obs.  367  367  367  367  367  367  367 
Log pseudolikelihood  -1441.739  -1435.797  -1440.266  -1436.581  -1444.365  -1445.120   -1439.325 
Prob>χ
2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: Negative binomial estimates. Dependent variable is DEATHijt. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted 
for clustering on country-level. Continent dummies, time trend and constant term included in all specifications. ***, 
**, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.     




Table 8: Disaster fatalities and aid from different donor countries 
   Storms   Floods    Earthquakes  
Ln(FRENCH AIDj,t-1)  0.789  0.136  -2.723*** 
  (0.616)  (0.496)  (0.923) 
Ln(GERMAN AIDj,t-1)  0.513  -0.566***  -1.038* 
  (0.437)  (0.215)  (0.562) 
 Ln(JAPANESE AIDj,t-1)  0.102  -0.429**  -1.236*** 
  (0.148)  (0.170)  (0.231) 
Ln(UK AIDj,t-1)  -0.538  -0.662**  0.375 
  (0.418)  (0.302)  (1.568) 
 Ln(USA AIDj,t-1)  -0.053  -0.690**  -0.957** 
  (0.272)  (0.271)  (0.441) 
     Notes: Negative binomial estimates. Dependent variable is DEATHijt.  Standard errors (in parentheses) 
    are adjusted for clustering on country-level. Covariates from the baseline specification (equation (5)), 
    continent dummies, time trend and constant term included in all specifications. ***, **, * indicate 
    significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.     




Table 9: Disaster fatalities, aid and colonial background 
   Storms   Floods    Earthquakes  
Ln(AIDj,t-1)  0.644  -0.262  0.029 
  (0.412)  (0.605)  (0.634) 
COLONYj   0.275   -0.115  2.897** 
  (0.641)  (0.509)  (1.246) 
 COLONYj*AIDj,t-1  0.380  -0.299  -1.027 
  (0.501)  (0.487)  (0.657) 
Ln(FRENCH AIDj,t-1)  -1.379  0.152  -2.650  
  (0.501)  (0.312)  (0.866) 
FRENCH COLONYj   1.207***  -0.421  n.a.  
  (0.291)  (0.243) 
 FRENCH COLONYj*AIDj,t-1  -1.303  -4.400***  n.a.  
  (0.927)  (0.390) 
Ln(UK AIDj,t-1)  0.266  -0.712*  -1.019 
  (0.469)  (0.387)  (2.019) 
UK COLONYj   0.005  -0.633*  -0.148  
  (0.445)  (0.373)  (1.490) 
 UK COLONYj*AIDj,t-1  -2.430**  0.077   4.078 
  (0.800)  (0.402)  (3.303)  
 Notes: Negative binomial estimates. Dependent variable is DEATHijt. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted 
for clustering on country-level. Covariates from the baseline specification (equation (5)), continent dummies, time 
trend and constant term included in all specifications. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, 
respectively.     




Table 10: Disaster fatalities, aid and institutional quality  
   Storms   Floods    Earthquakes  
Ln(AIDj,t-1)  0.687  -0.144  -0.567 
  (0.546)  (0.122)  (0.716) 
CORR CONTjt  0.517  -1.163***  -1.683* 
  (0.524)  (0.382)  (0.867) 
CORR CONTjt* AIDj,t-1  -0.186  -0.054  0.915 
  (0.573)  (0.274)  (0.753) 
Ln(AIDj,t-1)  0.288  -0.297  -0.296 
  (0.500)  (0.329)  (0.353) 
GOV EFFjt  0.537  -1.033***  -2.199*** 
  (0.430)  (0.320)  (0.510) 
 GOV EFFjt * AIDj,t-1  -1.015  0.072  -0.403 
  (1.103)  (0.335)  (0.304) 
Ln(AIDj,t-1)  1.133**  -0.523  0.263 
  (0.440)  (0.522)  (0.493) 
POL STABjt  0.354  0.264  -2.939*** 
  (0.322)  (0.363)  (0.790) 
 POL STABjt* AIDj,t-1  0.496  -0.097  1.968*** 
  (0.320)  (0.443)  (0.599) 
Ln(AIDj,t-1)  0.842*  -0.362   -0.608 
  (0.481)  (0.279)  (0.586) 
REG QALjt  0.120  -1.084*  -1.713*** 
  (0.618)  (0..568)  (0.436) 
 REG QALjt* AIDj,t-1  0.011  0.340   1.299* 
  (0.732)  (0.400)  (0.786) 
Ln(AIDj,t-1)  -0.092  -0.613**  -0.805 
  (0..687)  (0.247)  (0.927) 
RULE LAWjt  0.552  -0.608**  -0.903 
  (0.433)  (0.257)  (0.957) 
 RULE LAWjt* AIDj,t-1  -1.143  -0.681**  1.060 
  (0.791)  (0.293)  (0.952) 
Ln(AIDj,t-1)  0.831***  -0.359  -1.958 
  (0.304)  (0.328)  (1.341) 
VOICE ACCjt  -0.301  -0.501*  0.051 
  (0.408)  (0.300)  (0.642) 
 VOICE ACCjt* AIDj,t-1  -0.532  -0.196  0.943 
  (0.572)  (0.765)  (0.817) 
Ln(AIDj,t-1)  0.814*  -0.483  -2.959*** 
  (0.465)  (0.447)  (0.478) 
DEMOCRACYjt  -0.125***  -0.012  0.099*** 
  (0.054)  (0.026)  (0.030) 
 DEMOCRACYjt* AIDj,t-1  0.039  0.010  0.181 
  (0.054)  (0.033)  (0.053) 
   Notes: Negative binomial estimates. Dependent variable is DEATHijt.. Standard errors (in parentheses) 
   are adjusted for clustering on country-level. Covariates from the baseline specification (equation (5)), 
   continent dummies, time trend and constant term included in all specifications. ***, **, * indicate 
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7  Appendix 
 
  
    
Figure  3: Distribution of Cyclone Mortality – World 
 
 
     Data source: Dilley et al. (2005) 
 
Figure  4: Distribution of Cyclone Mortality risk – Asia 
 






    
Figure  5: Distribution of Flood Mortality - World 
 
 
Data source: Dilley et al. (2005) 
 
 
Figure  6: Distribution of Flood Mortality Risk - Asia 
 




    
Figure  7: Distribution of Earthquake Mortality - World 
 
 
Data source: Dilley et al. (2005) 
 
 
Figure  8: Distribution of Earthquake Mortality risk - Asia 
 
Data source: Dilley et al. (2005) 33 
 
   
Table 11: The determinants of disaster fatalities - ZINB 
  
   Storms   Floods    Earthquakes  
  11.1   11.2   11.3   11.4   11.5   11.6 
Ln(AIDj,t-1)   0.252*     -0.263**      -0.344  
   (0.133)       (0.116)      (0.263)  
Ln(3yr. AIDj,t-1)     0.229*      -0.319**     -0.338  
      (0.125)      (0.136)      (0.312)  
 Ln(GDP j,t-1)    -0.690***   -0.729***   -0.542***   -0.605***   -0.406    -0.528  
  (0.260)    (0.887)    (0.215)   (0.203)    (0.745)    (0.863)  
GINIjt   -0.010    -0.015   -0.033*   -0.032*   -0.002   -0.001 
  (0.022)    (0.023)   (0.017)   (0.018)   (0.033)   (0.036) 
 Ln(POP jt)   0.703***    0.746***   0.196    0.215    0.341    0.420 
  (0.134)    (0.138)    (0.138)    (0.145)    (0.333)    (0.335)  
 Ln(POPDENSjt)   -0.049    -0.075   -0.076   -0.104    -0.855**   -0.883** 
   (0.146)    (0.147)   (0.131)    (0.149)    (0.373)   (0.374)  
OPENjt   0.004   0.006   -0.003   -0.002   -0.002   -0.001 
  (0.005)   (0.005)   (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.012)   (0.014) 
DISASTERSjt    0.097**   0.090**   0.384***   0.336***   0.028    0.023  
  (0.0437)    (0.0407)   (0.128)    (0.127)    (0.219)    (0.239)  
 NATHAZ – RISKj    0.934***   0.982***    0.352*    0.345*    2.093**    2.126**  
  (0.207)    (0.215)    (0.186)    (0.202)    (0.875)    (0.943)  
1
st stage Probit model 
Ln(AIDj,t-1)   -0.165      -0.376**      -0.483** 
   (0.133)      (0.174)       (0.219)  
Ln(3yr. AIDj,t-1)     -0.070       -0.293     -0.925** 
      (0.165)      (0.184)      (0.417)  
 Ln(GDP j,t-1)    -0.107    -0.066    -0.473**   -0.308   0.249   -0.528  
  (0.321)    (0.887)    (0.215)    (0.233)   (0.353)    (1.051)  
Ln(POP jt)   -0.446***   -0.385*   -0.598*   -0.557**    -0.063    -0.872** 
   (0.138)   (0.232)   (0.178)   (0.210)   (0.337)    (0.425)  
DISASTERSjt    -8.916***   -10.150   -8.363***   -8.163***    -12.330***    -17.410*** 
   (1.115)    (8.761)    (0.702)    (0.661)    (2.826)    (5.295)  
 NATHAZ – RISKj    0.0530    0.288    -0.163    -0.159    1.470    1.446** 
  (0.207)    (0.215)    (0.186)    (0.202)    (0.875)    (0.943)  
Obs.  2186  1978  2174  1966   2186  1978 
Nonzero Obs.  430  403  605  560  197   177 
Log pseudolikelihood  -2468.351  -2282.336  -3614.626  -3307.053   -1200.485  -1080.443  
Prob> χ
2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Vuong Test (z-value) 
a  14.21***   14.05***  16.55***   16.36***   7.22***   6.97*** 
 Notes: ZINB-estimates. Dependent variable is DEATHijt. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering 
on country-level. The 1
st stage probit regression estimates the probability that nobody in nation   and year   died 
from the specific natural disaster. The 2
nd stage negative-binomial estimates the number of disaster deaths. Continent 
dummies, time trend and constant term included in all 2
nd stage negative-binomial specifications. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively. 
aThe test compares the ZINB with a negative binomial model 










Table  12: The determinants of Storm fatalities and Institutions - ZINB  
    12.1   12.2   12.3   12.4   12.5   12.6   12.7
b 
Ln(AIDj,t-1)  0.239*    0.230*   0.205    0.249*   0.243*   0.258*   0.162  
  (0.143)    (0.135)    (0.147)    (0.135)    (0.140)    (0.137)    (0.132)  
 Ln(AIDj,t-1)   -0.656**   -0.576**   -0.572**    -0.668**   -0.650**   -0.717***   -0.203  
   (0.260)    (0.281)    (0.236)   (0.271)    (0.260)    (0.261)    (0.687)  
Ln(GDP j,t-1)   -0.087  
   (0.210)  
CORR CONTjt     -0.215  
     (0.224)  
GOV EFFjt       -0.425  
       (0.263)  
POL STABjt         -0.062  
         (0.259)  
REG QALjt           -0.073  
           (0.200)  
RULE LAWjt             0.059  
             (0.193)  
VOICE ACCjt               -0.003  
               (0.021)  
GINIjt   -0.011   -0.013   -0.014   -0.010   -0.011   -0.010   -0.037 
   (0.022)    (0.022)   (0.021)   (0.022)   (0.022)   (0.022)   (0.028) 
 Ln(POP jt)   0.706***     0.712***     0.671***   0.704***     0.702***   0.707***     0.094 
   (0.134)    (0.137)    (0.134)   (0.133)    (0.134)    (0.135)    (0.214)  
DISASTERSjt    0.101**    0.107**   0.125**   0.0981**   0.100**    0.0957**    0.162*** 
   (0.046)    (0.043)    (0.052)    (0.044)    (0.043)    (0.044)    (0.052)  
 NATHAZ – RISKj    0.947***    0.919***    0.997***   0.934***   0.930***   0.923***    0.764  
   (0.208)    (0.201)    (0.236)    (0.204)    (0.205)   (0.207)    (0.469)  
1
st stage Probit  
Ln(AIDj,t-1)   -0.161    -0.156    -0.164    -0.165    -0.164    -0.167    -0.135  
   (0.132)    (0.129)    (0.132)    (0.132)    (0.132)    (0.133)    (0.438)  
 Ln(GDP j,t-1)    -0.111    -0.104    -0.132    -0.108    -0.110    -0.104    0.205  
  (0.316)   (0.311)    (0.319)    (0.316)    (0.315)    (0.319)    (6.521)  
Ln(POP jt)   -0.446***    -0.449***    -0.413***    -0.445***   -0.446***   -0.445***   -0.570  
   (0.140)    (0.138)    (0.153)    (0.137)    (0.139)    (0.135)    (1.446)  
DISASTERSjt    -8.764***    -9.271***    -8.951***   -8.985***  -9.018***    -8.820***    -11.920***  
   (1.149)    (1.174)    (1.097)    (1.106)    (1.127)    (1.076)   (1.251) 
 NATHAZ – RISKj    0.061    0.060    0.037    0.051    0.054    0.047    0.036 
   (0.304)   (0.295)   (0.286)    (0.291)    (0.294)   (0.288)    (2.202)  
Obs.  2186  2186  2186  2186  2186  2186  2118 
Nonzero Obs.  430  430  430  430  430  430  425 
Log pseudolikelihood  -2468.210  -2467.615  -2465.740  -2468.301   -2468.258  -2468.28   -2466.052 
Prob> χ
2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Vuong Test (z-value) 
a  14.28***   14.21***   14.56***  14.24***  14.23***   14.20***   13.99***  
Notes: ZINB-estimates. Dependent variable is DEATHijt. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering 
on country-level. The 1
st stage probit regression estimates the probability that nobody in nation   and year   died 
from the specific natural disaster. The 2
nd stage negative-binomial estimates the number of disaster deaths. Continent 
dummies, time trend and constant term included in all 2
nd stage negative-binomial specifications. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively. 
aThe test compares the ZINB with a negative binomial model 
and selects the one that is closest to the true conditional distribution (Vuong 1989). 
bindicates that ZINB model did 





Table  13: The determinants of Flood fatalities and Institutions - ZINB 
     13.1   13.2   13.3   13.4   13.5   13.6   13.7 
Ln(AIDj,t-1)   -0.344***    -0.321***    -0.292**   -0.187*    -0.298**    -0.260**    -0.216* 
   (0.119)    (0.110)    (0.121)    (0.102)    (0.117)    (0.115)    (0.130)  
 Ln(AIDj,t-1)   -0.273    -0.192    -0.499***     -0.296*   -0.262    -0.381**    -0.452***   
   (0.166)    (0.179)   (0.164)    (0.154)    (0.166)   (0.164)    (0.159)  
Ln(GDP j,t-1)   -0.807*** 
  (0.219)  
CORR CONTjt     -0.846***   
     (0.213)  
GOV EFFjt       -0.318* 
       (0.174)  
POL STABjt         -0.696*** 
         (0.221)  
REG QALjt           -0.631*** 
           (0.194)  
RULE LAWjt             -0.376**  
             (0.191)  
VOICE ACCjt               -0.021  
               (0.0204) 
GINIjt   -0.024   -0.025   -0.036**   -0.031*   -0.027*    -0.028   -0.031* 
  (0.016)    (0.017)    (0.017)    (0.017)   (0.016)   (0.017)    (0.017)  
 Ln(POP jt)   0.164    0.264*    0.150    0.288*    0.191    0.172    0.207  
  (0.149)    (0.150)    (0.150)    (0.142)    (0.147)    (0.142)    (0.138)  
DISASTERSjt    0.314***   0.314***   0.403***   0.339***     0.343***     0.358***     0.372*** 
   (0.109)    (0.114)    (0.124)    (0.111)    (0.114)    (0.124)    (0.128)  
 NATHAZ – RISKj    0.239    0.321**   0.372**   0.340**   0.344**   0.451**    0.391** 
   (0.166)    (0.157)    (0.169)    (0.168)    (0.171)    (0.183)    (0.177)  
1
st stage Probit  
Ln(AIDj,t-1)   -0.306*    -0.306*    -0.371**    -0.327*    -0.332*    -0.370**   -0.417**  
   (0.171)   (0.175)   (0.182)   (0.170)    (0.173)    (0.171)   (0.200)  
 Ln(GDP j,t-1)    -0.402*    -0.398*    -0.457**   -0.454**    -0.436**    -0.470**   -0.488** 
   (0.223)   (0.227)    (0.222)    (0.219)    (0.217)    (0.212)    (0.218)  
Ln(POP jt)   -0.513***   -0.515***  -0.590***     -0.546***  -0.554***  -0.591***     -0.613*** 
   (0.194)    (0.196)    (0.186)    (0.180)    (0.188)    (0.178)   (0.199)  
DISASTERSjt    -8.038***   -8.006***   -8.330***   -8.153***   -8.182***     -8.305***   -8.472***   
   (0.660)   (0.703)   (0.739)    (0.684)   (0.700)    (0.700)    (0.837)  
 NATHAZ – RISKj    -0.175    -0.151    -0.149   -0.167   -0.161    -0.148    -0.124  
   (0.156)    (0.158)    (0.169)   (0.164)    (0.161)    (0.166)   (0.185)  
Obs.  2174  2174  2174  2174  2174  2174  2106 
Nonzero Obs.  605  605  605  605  605  605  601 
Log pseudolikelihood   -3595.895   -3596.888  -3609.905  -3601.927   -3602.016  -3609.569    -3588.584 
Prob> χ
2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Vuong Test (z-value)
a  16.34***  16.27***  16.68***  16.43***    16.38***   16.37***    16.57***   
Notes: ZINB-estimates. Dependent variable is DEATHijt. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering 
on country-level. The 1
st stage probit regression estimates the probability that nobody in nation   and year   died 
from the specific natural disaster. The 2
nd stage negative-binomial estimates the number of disaster deaths. Continent 
dummies, time trend and constant term included in all 2
nd stage negative-binomial specifications. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively. 
aThe test compares the ZINB with a negative binomial model 
and selects the one that is closest to the true conditional distribution (Vuong 1989).  36 
 
  37 
 
  
Table  14: The determinants of Earthquake fatalities and Institutions - ZINB 
    14.1   14.2   14.3   14.4   14.5   14.6   14.7 
Ln(AIDj,t-1)   -0.448***   -0.425***   -0.545**    -0.158    -0.449***   -0.294    -0.288  
   (0.174)    (0.157)    (0.269)    (0.246)    (0.173)    (0.275)   (0.308)  
 Ln(AIDj,t-1)   0.479    0.795***   0.100    0.003    0.344    -0.125    -0.273  
   (0.321)    (0.230)    (0.485)    (0.675)    (0.367)    (0.832)   (0.852)  
Ln(GDP j,t-1)   -1.423*** 
   (0.369)  
CORR CONTjt     -1.996***  
      (0.297)  
GOV EFFjt       -1.062  
       (0.665)  
POL STABjt         -1.044*** 
          (0.293)  
REG QALjt           -1.305*** 
           (0.310)  
RULE LAWjt             -0.284  
              (0.540)  
VOICE ACCjt               -0.014  
               (0.064) 
GINIjt   0.012   -0.003   0.001   -0.012   -0.019   -0.010   -0.010  
  (0.026)    (0.020)   (0.028)   (0.043)   (0.027)   (0.034)   (0.037)  
 Ln(POP jt)   0.101    0.384*    -0.193    0.609*    0.230    0.390    0.432  
  (0.297)    (0.207)    (0.513)    (0.348)    (0.271)    (0.341)   (0.345) 
DISASTERSjt    0.127    0.110    0.0966    0.218    0.105    -0.0118    0.0210  
   (0.232)    (0.200)    (0.212)    (0.303)    (0.256)    (0.232)    (0.223)  
 NATHAZ – RISKj    0.999    1.075**   0.925    1.921*   1.324**   2.090**   2.263**  
   (0.722)    (0.496)    (1.138)    (0.984)    (0.668)    (0.929)    (0.919)  
1
st stage Probit  
Ln(AIDj,t-1)   -0.447    -0.443**   -0.554    -0.459    -0.461**    -0.490    -0.425  
   (0.979)   (0.214)    (0.398)    (0.451)    (0.206)    (0.510)    (0.576)  
 Ln(GDP j,t-1)    0.584    0.423    0.925    0.766   0.314    0.851    0.746*  
   (1.811)    (0.397)    (0)    (0)    (0)   (0)  (0.365) 
Ln(POP jt)   -0.150    -0.115   -0.316    -0.199    -0.0789    -0.247    -0.195  
   (1.413)    (0.226)    (0.302)    (0.353)    (0.276)    (0.387)    (0.440)  
DISASTERSjt    -10.94    -10.36***   -12.26***   -11.01***    -10.83***    -12.00***   -12.07***  
   (0)    (0.823)   (1.832)   (1.541)    (1.561)    (1.953)   (1.708)  
 NATHAZ – RISKj    1.143   1.146***    1.104**   1.116***    1.319*    1.096***   1.165***  
  (0.955)    (0.407)    (0.437)    (0.398)    (0.674)    (0.364)    (0.392)  
Obs.  2186  2186  2186  2186  2186  2186  2118 
Nonzero Obs.  197  197  197  197  197  197  197 
Log pseudolikelihood  -1194.289   -1186.551  -1198.308  -1195.723   -1194.314  -1200.931   -1201.144 
Prob> χ
2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Vuong Test (z-value)
a  7.30***  7.33***   7.09***   7.52***  7.28***   7.13***  7.13*** 
Notes: ZINB-estimates. Dependent variable is DEATHijt. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering 
on country-level. The 1
st stage probit regression estimates the probability that nobody in nation   and year   died 
from the specific natural disaster. The 2
nd stage negative-binomial estimates the number of disaster deaths. Continent 
dummies, time trend and constant term included in all 2
nd stage negative-binomial specifications. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively. 
aThe test compares the ZINB with a negative binomial model 




Table 15: Disaster fatalities and aid from different donor countries - ZINB 
  Storms   Floods    Earthquakes  
  Coeff.    ZI Probit  Coeff.    ZI Probit  Coeff.    ZI Probit  
Ln(FRENCH AIDj,t-1)  -0.100  -0.153  0.008  -0.123  1.011
 a  -0.090 
  (0.423)  (0.535)  (0.248)  (0.219)  (0.814)  (1.787) 
Ln(GERMAN AIDj,t-1)  0.371  -0.342  -0.337***  -0.428***  -1.475***  -1.117 
  (0.229)  (0.787)  (0.117)  (0.164)  (0.354)  (1.140) 
 Ln(JAPANESE AIDj,t-1)  0.158
a  -0.450  -0.284***  -0.150  -0.804***  -0.294 
  (0.185)  (0.403)  (0.080)  (0.108)  (0.245)  (0.438) 
Ln(UK AIDj,t-1)  -0.725  -0.188  -0.682***  -0.593  -0.437  -3.064  
  (0.441)  (0.692)  (0.252)  (0.925)  (0.571)  (1.700) 
 Ln(USA AIDj,t-1)  0.500**
a  0.071  -0.440***  -0.195  -0.042
a  -1.278 
  (0.228)  (0.433)  (0.107)  (0.158)  (0.294)  (0.698) 
 Notes: ZINB-estimates. Dependent variable is DEATHijt. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering 
on country-level. The 
1st stage probit regression estimates the probability that nobody in nation   and year   died from 
the specific natural disaster. The 2
nd stage negative-binomial estimates the number of disaster deaths. Covariates 
from the ZINB baseline specification (Table 11), continent dummies, time trend and constant term included in all 2
nd 
stage negative-binomial specifications. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively. 































Table 16: Disaster fatalities, aid and institutional quality 
    Storms   Floods    Earthquakes  
  Coeff.    ZI Probit  Coeff.    ZI Probit  Coeff.    ZI Probit  
Ln(AIDj,t-1)  0.377***  -0.150  -0.394***  -0.200  -0.603***
a  -0.942 
  (0.129)  (0.131)  (0.139)  (0.229)  (0.193)  (1.726) 
CORR CONTjt  0.623**  0.478  -1.199***  -0.562  -1.923***  -7.954* 
  (0.253)  (0.355)  (0.232)  (0.820)  (0.430)  (4.195) 
CORR CONTjt* AIDj,t-1  -0.317***  -0.264  0.323***  0.172  0.219  3.462 
  (0.117)  (0.218)  (0.101)  (0.216)  (0.321)  (2.481) 
Ln(AIDj,t-1)  0.379***  -0.493  -0.269**  -0.377**  -0.462**  -0.352 
  (0.145)  (0.476)  (0.124)  (0.177)  (0.230)  (0.255) 
GOV EFFjt  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
 GOV EFFjt * AIDj,t-1  -0.442***  -0.720*  0.030  0.005  -0.870***  -0.625** 
  (0.106)  (0.391)  (0.086)  (0.096)  (0.208)  (0.303) 
Ln(AIDj,t-1)  0.149^a  -0.329  -0.277***   -0.345**  -0.163  65.008*** 
  (0.162)  (0.642)  (0.075)  (0.131)  (0.446)  (0.518) 
POL STABjt  0.153  0.644  -1.076***  0.183  -2.256***  -93.576 
  (0.305)  n.a.  (0.181)  (0.242)  (0.773)  (0.835) 
 POL STABjt* AIDj,t-1  -0.413***  -0.431***  0.360***  -0.087  0.633  -17.019*** 
  (0.103)  (0.155)  (0.070)  (0.089)  (0.464)  (0.835) 
Ln(AIDj,t-1)  0.373**  -0.176  -0.427***  -0.308*  -0.243  -0.184 
  (0.162)  (0.123)  (0.146)  (0.180)  (0.187)  (0.736) 
REG QALjt  0.243  -0.180  -1.536***  -0.058  -1.802***  -0.194 
  (0.329)  (0.565)  (0.467)  (0.343)  (0.669)  (1.464) 
 REG QALjt* AIDj,t-1  -0.313*  -0.093  0.461***  0.006  0.532  -0.690 
  (0.182)  (0.187)  (0.139)  (0.104)  (0.474)  (0.772) 
Ln(AIDj,t-1)  0.370**  -0.086  -0.366***  -0.357***  -0.449***
 a  0.467 
  (0.161)  (0.141)  (0.128)  (0.179)  (0.179)  (13.840) 
RULE LAWjt  0.293  0.435  -1.048***  0.053  -1.371***  -16.037*** 
  (0.263)  (0.607)  (0.228)  (0.317)  (0.479)  (3.634) 
 RULE LAWjt* AIDj,t-1  -0.312**  -0.188  0.330***  -0.102  0.016  5.938*** 
  (0.149)  (0.148)  (0.101)  (0.116)  (0.327)  (5.626) 
Ln(AIDj,t-1)  0.429**  0.023  -0.363***  -0.352**  -0.265  696.449*** 
  (0.184)  (0.245)  (0.138)  (0.173)  (0.224)  (17.202) 
VOICE ACCjt  0.644*  1.214  -0.868***  -0.009  0.546  613.177*** 
  (0.337)  (1.522)  (0.282)  (0.383)  (0.437)  (14.891) 
 VOICE ACCjt* AIDj,t-1  -0.393*  -0.448  0.287**  0.045  0.546  -674.046*** 
  (0.215)  (0.851)  (0.129)  (0.120)  (0.437)  (16.594) 
Ln(AIDj,t-1)  .207  11.926***  -0.272*   -0.501**  -0.492  10.489 
  (0.139)  (0.308)  (0.159)  (0.208)  (0.397)  (30.378) 
DEMOCRACYjt  0.013  14.300***  0.052  -0.082*  -0.103^a  1.224 
  (0.033)  (0.270)  (0.039)  (0.043)  (0.119)  (17.077) 
 DEMOCRACYjt* AIDj,t-1  0.001  -5.037***  0.012  0.021  0.049  -0.909 
  (0.017)  (0.123)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.054)  (4.648) 
Notes: ZINB-estimates. Dependent variable is DEATHijt. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering 
on country-level. The 
1st stage probit regression estimates the probability that nobody in nation   and year   died 
from the specific natural disaster. The 2
nd  stage  negative-binomial estimates the number of disaster deaths. 
Covariates from the ZINB baseline specification (Table 11), continent dummies, time trend and constant term 
included in all 2
nd stage negative-binomial specifications. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, 
respectively. 






Table 17: Variable Definition and Source    
Variable  Description  Source 
DEATH  Total number killed by a natural disaster  EM-DAT, CRED (2008) 
     
AID  Aid per capita (current US Dollars)  World Bank, 
  Total real ODA commitments in recipient country per 
capita 
WDI 
     
GDP p.c.  Real GDP per capita (US Dollars in 2000 prices)  Penn World Table 
Version 6.2 
     
GINI  Measure for income inequality  gruen03 
     
POP  Total Population expressed in thousands  World Bank, 
    WDI 
     
POPDENS  People per square kilometer  World Bank, 
    WDI 
     
OPEN  Exports plus Imports of goods and services divided by 
GDP 
Penn World Table 
Version 6.2 
     
     
MAGNITUDE  Disaster magnitude expressed in:   
  Storms: Wind speed measured in Kilometers per hour  EM-DAT, CRED (2008) 
  Floods: Number of months per year in the country,  NOAA (2008) 
  with a precipitation sum that is 1 standard deviation   
  above the long time precipitation mean in the country   
  Earthquakes: Richter scale  EM-DAT, CRED (2008) 
     
NATHAZ-RISK  GIS-DATA on spatial mortality risk  Dilley et al. (2005) 
  Country mean (0-10)   
     
LATITUDE  Absolute Latitude in degrees  Kahn (2005) 
     
ELEVATION  Elevation in meters  Kahn (2005) 
     
CORR CONT  Perception of the extent to which public  Kaufmann et al. (2008) 
  power is exercised for private gain, including   
  both petty and grand forms of corruption,   
  as well as influence of elites.   
     
GOV EFF  Perception of the quality of public  Kaufmann et al. (2008) 
  services, the quality of the civil service   
  and the degree of its independence from   
  political pressures, the quality of policy   
  formulation and implementation, and the   41 
 
  credibility of the government's commitment   
  to such policies.   
     
POL STAB  Perception of the likelihood that the government  Kaufmann et al. (2008) 
  will be destabilized or overthrown by un-   
  constitutional or violent means, including   
  politically-motivated violence and terrorism.   
     
REG QAL  Perception of the ability of the government  Kaufmann et al. (2008) 
  to formulate and implement sound policies and   
  regulations that permit and promote private   
  sector development.   
     
RULE LAW  perceptions of the extent to which agents have  Kaufmann et al. (2008) 
  confidence in and abide by the rules of society,   
  and in particular the quality of contract   
  enforcement, property rights, the police, and the   
  courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.   
     
VOICE ACC  Perception of the extent to which a  Kaufmann et al. (2008) 
  country's citizens are able to participate   
  in selecting their government, as well as   
  freedom of expression, freedom of association,   
  and a free media.   
     
DEMOCRACY  Proxy for the political system in a country.  Marshall & Jaggers  
  Include information on competitiveness and openness  (2005) 
  of executive recruitment, constraints on chief executive,    
   regulation and competitiveness of participation.    
     
COLONY  Colonial Background   Correlates of War  
  Dummy variable that switches to one if the    2 Project (2008) 
  country has ever been a colony     
     
AFFINITY USA   Extended Gartzke index on voting patterns   Voeten and  
  in the UN General Assembly. Takes a value between -1 
(USA and recipient never voted the  
Merdzandovic 
(2009) 
  Same) and 1 (USA and recipient always voted the 
same). 
 
     
OIL RESOURCES  Proved oil reserves in 1000 tons  US Energy 
Information 
Administration  
     




   